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Community Commission and the Court of First 
Instance
Predatory pricing is one of the most debated issue among the many possibly abusive behaviors of a 
dominant firm. The general prohibition of the abuse of a dominant power in the competition law is meant 
to render more difficult to use that power but not to disable them to compete. The borderline between a 
rough but lawful competitive behavior of a dominant firm and the illegal abuse of the market power could 
sometimes be very narrow. One of that narrow line is associated with the so called predatory pricing or 
exclusionary pricing. One of the necessary preconditions for predatory pricing is that the firm is required 
to set the price below costs. But could it be a sufficient condition as well? Before the AKZO-case lawyers 
and economists seemed to agree that predatory pricing requires a second phase, after the dominant firm 
successfully got its prey in the first phase, the recoupment phase during which the dominant firm is able the 
regain all of his former losses occurred in the first phase. Since the AKZO-case, the Commission succeeded 
to convince Courts of the EU that it would be enough to make probable but not certain that there had to be 
a recoupment phase but we don’t have to wait until it really happens. Most of the economists still think that 
predatory pricing is meaningless without recoupment, and what is more important, it would be beneficial 
to the consumers during the first phase unless there is no certainty of a second phase.1
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Although the concept of a dominant rm is not subject of this article, we cannot aord not 
to inform our reader the most important aspects of this concept. Dominance is essentially 
a legal rather than an economic concept. Economists focus on the issue of market power 
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1  This paper is an improved version of a habilitation lecture held in Debrecen University on December 5, 2008.
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rather than dominance. While there are obvious links between the two concepts they are 
somewhat dierent. In economic terms market power is dened as power over price. In a 
not perfectly competition markets the rm’s demand curve is always downward sloping. 
is means that, if the rm unilaterally increases its prices, it will lose some but, crucially, 
not all of its sales. is gives it some power over price. Many real world rms therefore have 
some market power and at the same time face competition from rivals. To be regarded as 
dominant, a rm, or group of rms, besides having sucient market power, it must be able 
to raise price or act in some other way independently of its rivals.2
A dominant rm, however, may face competition from other rms. A dominant rm is 
typically much larger than its rivals. ese smaller rms could achieve large increases in 
protability by competing aggressively with the dominant rm.3 It follows, that a dominant 
rm may have to face tough competition which may require tough responses from the 
dominant rm. e relevant question in this respect is that where is the borderline between 
harsh but genuine legal competitive measures and the abuse of that dominant position. In 
this paper we ask this question concerning only the allegedly predatory pricing behaviors of 
a dominant rm.
Predatory pricing generally involves three equally important parts:
– e company applying that policy has to be in a dominant position.
– e strategy must involve pricing, usually charging bellow cost prices, which usually 
leads to a signicant loss.
– A special market environment into which competitors may nd dicult to enter 
or reenter aer the dominant rm will successfully eliminated its existing competitors 
which enables it not only to regain (recoup) its former losses but to make extra prots 
in the future.
The Basic Economics of Predatory Pricing
e traditional theory of predatory pricing envisions two stages in carrying out the predation 
strategy − the predation stage and the post-predation stage. In the predation stage, the 
predator prices its product below some measure of economic cost − typically incremental 
cost − with the intent of driving its prey from the market. In the post-predation stage, 
the prey leverages the absence of meaningful competition to price its product at supra-
competitive levels, thereby recovering the losses incurred during the predation stage and 
earning monopoly prots thereaer (McGee 1980).
e consensus view in the literature, and this is a view that has prevailed for several 
decades now, is that traditional predation is dicult and hence frequently irrational. 
Because rms will re-enter the market when the predator commences pricing at supra-
competitive levels, recoupment of the losses incurred in the predation stage is virtually 
impossible. Hence, in order for the predation strategy to be successful, there must be some 
2 One of the earliest formulation of that concept by the European Court: ‘..the fact that an undertaking is compelled by 
the pressure of its competitors’ price reductions to lower its own prices is in general incompatible with that independent 
conduct which is the hallmark of a dominant position’. (Hoffman LaRoche v. Commission 1979, ECR 461 at para 71).
3 In the literature smaller firms in such circumstances are referred to as a ‘competitive fringe’. 
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type of barrier to entry that precludes entry from occurring when the predator prices at 
supra-competitive levels (Joskow and Klerovick 1979).
Traditional predation is likely to be particularly dicult in regulated network industries 
due to the high-proportion of sunk costs and the fact that productive capacity typically 
does not leave the industry even if particular competitors should exit the market. In other 
words, productive capacity in the industry serves as a check on supra-competitive pricing. 
Consequently, even if predation should succeed in driving a particular competitor from the 
market, the (independent) productive capacity that the competitor leaves behind continues 
to discipline pricing (Weisman 2002).
Starting as early as 1980’s, in concert with important developments in game theory, a 
number of modern, strategic theories of predation have emerged. ese models, which include 
nancial market predation, reputation models and cost signaling models,4 generally require 
conditions of asymmetric information. In other words, the predator has information that 
its prey does not, and it leverages this informational asymmetry to drive the prey from 
the market or to deter its expansion into new markets. In other words, the predator has 
information that its prey does not, and it leverages this informational asymmetry to drive 
the prey from the market or to deter its expansion into new markets.
In the case of nancial market predation, the prey is dependent upon some source of 
external nancing. e focus is on the relationship between the prey and its investors. e 
predator tries to manipulate that relationship. For example, the predator may reduce prices 
in order to reduce the protability of its rivals. e rival’s investors view this decrease in 
protability as a signal that prospects in this market are limited and decide to decrease 
nancial support accordingly. In this model, investors are unable to dierentiate between 
the predation campaign and managerial incompetence (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan
2000:54).
Telser (1966) set out a model of the “long purse” in which predation occurs because the 
predator, with superior resources, can outlast the prey. In Telser’s model the interest rate at 
which a rm can borrow increases as the rm’s reserves decrease, which in turn constrains 
the amount a rm can borrow. In order to remain viable, rms must incur per period 
xed costs even if they do not produce any output. Because this is common knowledge, 
the predatory rm can calculate the number of periods its prey could last given predatory 
prices. Under these conditions, a rm with greater resources can successfully deplete 
the reserves of the less capitalized victim, thus limiting the victim’s ability to borrow and 
eventually driving him from the market. If the additional monopoly prots outweigh the 
predator’s reduced prots that result from predatory pricing, predation is a rational strategy 
vis-à-vis a policy of entry accommodation. However, because all information is common 
knowledge, predation would not be observed in equilibrium. Because predation is costly to 
both rms, Telser suggests that the threat of predation should either deter entry in the rst 
place or result in the parties agreeing to merge, with the terms determined by the relative 
costs of predation in the absence of an agreement. Moreover, if potential victims anticipate 
this, they can alter their capital structure to increase the cost of successful predation, and 
thus favorably alter the buyout price (Kobayashi 2000:16).
Beniot (1984) also modeled predation with a nancially constrained entrant. Beniot 
rst presents an innitely repeated extensive form game where the entrant has resources 
4 For a review of this literature, see Tirole (1988), and Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000). 
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to survive a nite number of price wars. Under complete and perfect information, Beniot 
derives a “reverse chain store paradox” result, where entry is deterred as long as the entrant’s 
ability to survive is nite. He then examines a game with incomplete information where the 
predator knows the maximum number of periods the entrant can stay in, but only knows 
with probability whether the entrant is committed to stay in the industry until bankrupt. 
Beniot derives a mixed strategy equilibrium where entry occurs, with entry being an 
increasing function of the entrant’s nancial staying power. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) created a model where the entrant is uncertain about his per 
period xed costs and uses current prots to decide whether to remain in the market. Given 
this, the incumbent has an incentive to use predation to reduce the entrant’s prots in order 
to cause the entrant to infer that he has high costs and should exit. eir “signal jamming”
model can also be applied to lenders’ decisions to make or limit outside nancing. Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) derive nancial constraints based on rms’ attempts to control 
agency costs. In their model, lenders’ decisions regarding external nancing are sensitive 
to a rm’s short term performance. is gives managers incentives and addresses manager 
shareholder agency costs. However, a predator knowing this relationship between a rm 
and its lender can take advantage of it by using price predation to lower current prots, 
which in turn reduces external nancing and induces exit. If these contracts between rm 
and lender are observable, rms that are potential victims of predation will choose to make 
their contracts less sensitive to current performance, thus trading o higher agency costs 
for a lower threat of predation. e use of nancial contracting by potential victims to 
reduce the threat of predation, and the eect of renegotiation on its eectiveness is further 
examined in Snyder (1996). 
e reputation predation is based on a type of signaling that the predator seeks to gain a 
reputation for “toughness” and a strong willingness to defend its market at virtually any cost. 
e predator reduces prices in one market to induce the prey and other potential entrants to 
believe that the predator will cut price in other markets or in the predatory market at a later 
time. e predator seeks to establish a reputation as a price cutter, based on some perceived 
special advantage or characteristic. us, a predator trying to establish a reputation for 
nancial predation cuts price when it has superior nancial resources (and when the other 
conditions for nancial predation are present) (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000:74).
A set of studies examined reputation models where the assumption of perfect 
information was relaxed as a way to avoid the logic and result of the chain store paradox. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and 
Wilson (1982) developed models where some incumbents prefer to engage in predation 
rather than accommodating entry. Such preferences can result from the fact that predation 
is more protable than accommodation in the single market setting, or alternatively from 
a narrowly irrational preference for predation when it is not. e entrant in these models 
does not know ex-ante what type of incumbent he is facing, strong (those with a preference 
for predation) or weak (those that would prefer to accommodate entry in a single market 
game) (Kobayashi 2000:19).
In this models, the predator reduces its prices in order to signal to its rivals that he is a 
tough competitor and that opportunities for positive returns will be strictly limited either 
in other markets or in the predatory market in the future (Weisman 2002:5) It is important 
to note, however, that this theory may not be completely robust. Although economic theory 
views reputation eect predation as a separate and distinct predatory strategy, a reputation 
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eect theory based on irrational toughness may be too easy to assert and too dicult to 
prove (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000).
In the cost signaling predation the predator wishes to signal its rivals that it is a low-cost 
rather than a high-cost provider. Rivals will enter the market if they believe the dominant 
rm is a high-cost provider, but will not enter the market or will choose to exit the market if 
they believe the dominant rm is a low-cost provider. In cost signaling a predator drastically 
reduces prices to mislead the prey to believe that the predator has lower costs and to exit 
the market. More specically, a predator trying to establish a reputation for low cost cuts 
price below the short run prot-maximizing level. Observing the predator’s low price, the 
prey rationally believes that there is a least some probability that the predator has reduced 
costs. is lowers the prey’s expected returns and causes the prey to exist (Bolton, Brodley 
and Riordan 2000:100).
A few other theories have also been published oering alternative explanations to 
predation with less signicance. e theories of predation discussed above all rely on 
asymmetric information to generate rational equilibrium predation. However, asymmetric 
information is not a necessary condition to generate predation in equilibrium. Cabral and 
Riordan (1997) have a learning curve model of equilibrium predation, in which rms’ current 
period production costs are a function of the cumulative production. In such a learning 
curve environment, Cabral and Riordan show that rational predation occurs in equilibrium, 
where the predator expands output and lowers price in order to further take advantage of 
the learning curve cost reductions and to induce its rival’s exit. is predation can involve, 
but does not require, below-cost pricing. e welfare consequences of such learning curve 
predation are ambiguous. Marx and Shaer (1999) have a complete information model of 
predation in intermediate goods markets. In their model, a manufacturer makes sequential 
purchases from two suppliers of dierentiated inputs. ey show that below-cost pricing of 
marginal units by the rst supplier can facilitate rent extraction from the second, resulting 
in a higher joint surplus between the buyer and the rst supplier. In their model, below-
cost pricing does not result in exclusion, and welfare may increase or decrease (Kobayashi 
2000:17–18).
Predatory Pricing in the US Legislation
Predatory pricing has a long history in competition law dating back to the US Standard Oil
case in 1911, so the United States has a rich history of both statutory and case law that treats 
issues of price predation. e legal history of predatory pricing in the U.S. can be divided 
into three periods. During the rst period following enactment of the Sherman Act, claims 
of predatory pricing were taken quite seriously (Calvani 2000). Indeed, the predatory 
tactics employed by John D. Rockefeller and the “Standard Oil Trust” are part of American 
folklore (Tarbell 1904). e Standard Oil Case (1911) became the paradigm. It was widely 
believed that Standard Oil were successfully able to drive competitors from the marketplace 
by temporarily selling below cost. Once achieved, these rms would raise prices above a 
competitive level and use those monopoly prots to nance predation elsewhere until they 
had taken over the entire marketplace.5
5  In as early as in the fifties some economists had started to question whether Rockefeller and his company ever actually 
engaged in predatory pricing, see for example McKee (1958).
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is view reached its zenith in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Utah Pie Co. v. 
Continental Baking Co. Case. Utah Pie Co (the plainti), a leading vendor of frozen pies 
brought suit against three national bakeries alleging that they had increased their market 
share by predatory pricing. Finding that the national bakeries sought to increase their 
market share above their combined 28 percent, the Court concluded that they charged less 
for their pies in the plainti ’s market than they did elsewhere. Indeed, during the forty-
four month “price war”, the plainti ’s market share decrease to 45%. e Supreme Court 
reinstated the jury verdict for the plainti notwithstanding evidence that the plainti ’s 
sales volume had increased during the relevant period and that it had continued to make 
a prot. While the U.S. Court did not address the specic denition of “below cost” sales, 
it maintained that average total cost was the appropriate standard. Suce it to say that 
predatory pricing cases of that era were characterized by the relative large size of the alleged 
predator, geographic price discrimination, sales below average total costs, and predatory 
intent (Brodley and Hay 1981).
e second period began with the publication of a two Harvard Law School professors 
Donald F. Turner and Philip Areeda which radically changed the U.S. approach to the subject 
(Areeda and Turner 1975). eir important article oered a cost-based rule for determining 
whether or not a pricing strategy is predatory. Under the Areeda-Turner test, prices can be 
found to be predatory only if they are below marginal cost or, if that cannot be determined, 
below average variable cost.
Areeda and Turner observed that predatory pricing is not common.6 Nonetheless, they 
concluded that predatory pricing is still a subject for legitimate concern to antitrust policy 
makers as long as great care is taken not to deter vigorous competition. “at predatory 
pricing seems highly unlikely does not necessarily mean that there should be no antitrust 
rules against it. But it does suggest that extreme care be taken in formulating such rules, lest 
the threat of litigation…materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”7
Areeda and Turner develop their rule from an analysis of the short-run, static model of 
the rm used in all introductory price theory textbooks. According to the textbook theorem, 
marginal cost pricing leads to a proper allocation of resources in the short run and claiming 
that the only explanation for below-marginal cost pricing is exclusionary intent, Areeda 
and Turner suggest that a price below “reasonably anticipated” short-run marginal cost is 
predatory unless at or above average total cost. Since data on marginal costs are dicult to 
obtain, average variable costs, which are much easier to ascertain, should be used by the 
courts as a proxy for marginal costs in the above formulation, unless average variable costs 
fall signicantly below marginal cost in the relevant range of output (Calvani and Siegfried
1988:279–82).
Since then − for quite a long time − almost every Court of Appeals in the United States 
has accepted some form of the Areeda-Turner test (Hurwitz and Kovacic 1982). One of the 
problem with the Areeda-Turner cost-based test is that it is not easy to apply in reality. e 
determination of which costs are variable is a function of the jury. is means that pretrial 
6 See also in Bork (1978). Bork noted that while “[t]hese considerations do not demonstrate that price cutting could never 
under any circumstances be a successful method of predation,” it was nonetheless “unwise, therefore, to construct rules 
about a phenomenon that probably does not exist.”, see Kobayashi (2000:43).
7 According to the original article’s findings, empirical research suggests that it is difficult to segregate cases of predation 
from tough competition (Areeda and Turner 1975:711). 
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discovery and the trial itself are oen taken up with laborious and dicult issues of cost 
characterization and expert testimony on those points (Calvani 2000:6). 
e third and latest period started with the 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals in A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. e case involved a pricing battle between egg 
producers. e plainti ’s expert economist had testied at trial that the defendant’s prices 
were below its average total costs and less than its average variable costs for a period of time. 
Moreover, the cost data were accompanied by executive comments evidencing predatory 
intent. Some of the more colorful ones included: “We are going to run you out of…business. 
Your days are numbered.”8 Recognizing that application of a price/cost standard is “dicult 
business, the court stated that one should rst consider the likelihood that the predator 
would be able to recoup its predation costs.”9
Predatory prices are an investment in a future monopoly, a sacrice of today’s prots for 
tomorrow’s. e investment must be recouped. “If a monopoly price later is impossible, 
then the sequence is unprotable and we may infer that the low price now is not predatory. 
More importantly, if there can be no “later” in which recoupment could occur, then the 
consumer is an unambiguous beneciary even if the current price is less than the cost of 
production. Price less than cost today, followed by the competitive price tomorrow, bestows 
a gi on consumers. Because antitrust laws are designed for the benet of consumers, not 
competitors…, a gi of this kind is not actionable”.10 Because determination of likelihood of 
recoupment is easier than undertaking the price/cost characterization and comparison, the 
court held that trial courts ought to undertake the recoupment analysis rst. If recoupment 
is implausible, then one need not undertake the laborious price/cost exercise.11 “Market 
structure oers a way to cut the inquiry o at the pass, to avoid the imponderable questions 
that have made antitrust cases among the most drawn out and expensive types of litigation. 
Only if market structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire into the relation 
between prices and cost.”12
Recoupment is a necessary but insucient element of the plainti ’s case. e court went 
on to state that intent ought play no role in assessing whether conduct is predatory (Calvani 
2000:7). Several reasons support that conclusion. “Firms ‘intend’ to do all the business they 
can to crush their rivals if they can... Rivalry is harsh, and consumers gain the most when 
rms slash costs to the bone and pare price down to cost, all in pursuit of more business... 
Entrepreneurs who work hardest to cut their prices will do the most damage to their rivals... 
If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a forbidden ‘intent’, they run 
the risk of penalzing the motive forces of competition.”13
is approach was again applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. e case involved allegations of predatory pricing by 
Brown & Williamson against a smaller rival in an eort to discipline the pricing of generic 
cigarettes. e case is important for several reasons. e Court noted that predatory pricing 
was generally implausible. A few years earlier, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
8  A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. (1989:881, F.2d at 1398)
9 ie. 881, F.2d at 1400
10 ie. 881, F.2d at 1401
11 “It is much easier to determine from the structure of the market that recoupment is improbable than it is to find the 
cost a particular producer experiences in the short, middle, or long run (whichever proves pertinent)” i.d.
12 ie. 881, F.2d at 1401
13 ie. 881, F.2d at 1402
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Radio Corp., the Court had accepted the economic approach to the question of recoupment 
by quoting Easterbrook (1981:263): “...the short-run loss is denite, but the long-run gain 
depends on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to 
achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors 
eager to share in the excess prots. e success of any predatory scheme depends on 
maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to 
harvest some additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a signicant period of time, the predator must 
make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay o.”14
e Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. also held that 
plainti must prove the likelihood that the alleged predator will be able to  recoup the 
losses associated with its predatory pricing later. e Court reasoned that the unsuccessful 
predator (the rm that prices predatorily but is unsuccessful thereaer raising prices above 
a competitive level) does not present an antitrust issue. While that rm may have made life 
miserable for rms within the market, consumers reap the benet. Below-cost pricing may 
impose painful losses on its target is of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is 
not injured: It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws a for the protection of competition, not 
competitors.15
We can conclude that, while predatory pricing remains actionable under U.S. federal law, 
the current caselaw is quite skeptical of the theory generally. On the one hand, it is rarely 
tried and even more rarely successful. On the other, the costs of inappropriate intervention 
are particularly high since consumers are denied the benets of tough competition. Current 
law accepts the cost/price tests suggested by Professors Areeda and Turner, which are not 
easy to satisfy. Moreover, the recoupment requirement imposed by the Court in Brooke 
Group requires plainti to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of recoupment before 
going forward. e universe of actionable cases in U.S. federal courts may not be a null 
set, but it is not large. Consumers are the beneciaries of this change in the law (Calvani
2000:10).
Predatory Pricing Cases in the EU with Respect to the Effects of the
Areeda-Turner Principles
Allegations of predation also featured in the more recent Microso cases both in the EU and 
the US. It has usually something to do with special price cutting as a part of dominant rm’s
market strategy. Price competition involving price cutting or discounting is a normal part 
of competitive business behavior. Predatory pricing involves a policy of price-cutting by a 
dominant rm designed to eliminate competition so that the rm may reap higher prots at a 
later stage by charging higher prices once a competitor has been eliminated. In order to be 
successful this requires entry barriers to keep prevent new entry since otherwise it would 
not be possible for the predator to raise prices once its rival has been eliminated.
e Areeda and Turner arguments meant to emphasize that predation only arises when 
prices are held below marginal cost. Recognizing that, in practice, measuring marginal cost 
14 i.e. 268
15 This statement later became a kind of paraphase of saying that the very basic of any competition law were to defend 
competition not competitors. 
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may be extremely dicult, they argued that average variable costs could be used instead. 
e Areeda-Turner rule is designed to restrain rms pricing behavior as little as possible 
reecting the authors’ view that predation is a rare phenomenon. It is therefore arguably 
overly restrictive. Nevertheless it has had interesting adverse inuence on the Commission 
and Courts in the EU. ese rules became a special test on the basis of which predation 
could be proofed without any serious considerations to other necessary requirements to 
establish a predatory case (recoupment, for example). 
e Areeda-Turner test was rst applied in AKZO. In the resolution of this case, 
in December 1985, 10 million ECU ne was imposed on AKZO Chemie BV, a Dutch 
multinational chemical company for predatory pricing as an abuse its dominant position. 
e appeal was rejected in 1991. As for the facts, in the EEC organic peroxides market 
AKZO applied a policy of selective and below-cost price cutting designed to damage a 
small UK producer, ECS Ltd. to exclude it as a competitor. It can be seen from the Court’s 
judgment that the explanation of the cost-based test adopted in the case diers from that of 
Areeda-Turner’s. According to the court’s reasoning, prices below AVC “must be regarded 
as abusive”, because there could be no prot-maximizing reasons behind them. e only 
explanation for them is that they are aimed to eliminate competitors. 
e Commission found that AKZO was dominant in the organic peroxides market as a 
whole and had infringed Article 82 by pursuing a course of predation against ECS designed 
to drive it from the plastic sector. e Commission decision nding predation focused in 
AKZO’s threats and its eliminatory intent. e decision did not adopt the Areeda-Turner 
rule or lay down specic rules about the point at which low prices become predatory and 
abusive. It suggested that even prices above ATC could be predatory. AKZO appealed to the 
Court, and it accepted its arguments that some costs which the Commission had classied 
as variable were, in this case, xed.
e test in AKZO can be summed up as follows:
Prices below AVC are presumed to be predatory.1.
Prices above AVC but below ATC are not presumed predatory but are predatory if 2.
they are part of a plan to eliminate a competitor.
Since the ECJ decision on the AKZO case issued in 1991, it has become not just on the 
guiding rule in predatory cases for competition authorities and courts but has become a 
subject of severe criticism from many economists.16 But it was rearmed in TETRA PAK II 
and followed and applied by the CFI in France Télécom. 
e Areeda-Turner test, as a cost-based criteria, are problematic. In this case, parties 
submitted very dierent calculations of AKZO’s costs. e Court stated that a certain 
item in the cost list is not xed or variable by “nature”, and overruled the Commission’s 
classication of the labour costs as variable rather than xed. However, the Court did not 
give guidance on how costs are to be allocated in multi-product rms. For example, the 
Commission classied advertising costs as variable rather than xed, although AKZO 
insisted it to be.17
e Court did also rejected any other explanations for pricing under AVC: for example 
the launch of new lines, obsolete stock clearance, or using continuous production facilities 
(Jones and Sufrin 2007:450). It may be better for a rm (even one in a dominant position) to 
16 On the earliest critics is Phlips and Moras (1993).
17 The matte was ruled against AKZO only on the grounds of technicalities.
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sell temporarily at a loss and make some return than to make none at all. In paragraph 71 
the Court set out that circumstances like these are possible but not recognized any of them. 
In AKZO rules, the intention of the dominant rm became a crucial factor when prices are 
between AVC and ATC. e Court recognized that pricing at this range can be rational and 
non-predatory in certain circumstances. Ruling out all of these possibilities the Court laid 
out the test of intentions. According to that test, if the pricing behavior were a part of a plan 
intended to exclude deliberately and systematically a competitor from the market, that it is 
a sucient proof of predation.18
In AKZO, the Court did not address expressly the issue of recoupment. In the US, courts 
do not nd predatory pricing unless the plainti would be able to demonstrate that the 
alleged predator had a serious probability to recoup its investments in below-cost prices. 
is rule comes from the BROOKE GROUP (1993) in which the Supreme Court stated 
that even if the plainti can show below-cost prices and a predatory intent, there will be no 
antitrust violation. e position concerning the issue of recoupment in EC law is dierent. 
e principle laid down in AKZO and was conrmed in TETRA PAK II. Originally, the 
Commission did not found that Tetra Pak had had a reasonable chance of recoupment but 
the Court said that the Commission did not have to prove that Tetra Pak could recoup.
e AKZO-case has been dominating the predatory pricing cases since in the EU. e 
AKZO-rules state that if the costs of a dominant rm
?? during a certain period of time has been set below the AVC, or
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
proved
then it has to be a proven case of predatory pricing without any further considerations, 
including recoupment as well. Commission ruled on that principle in several similar cases 
involving dominant integrated telephone companies providing access to their network for 
its competitors (the alternative ADSL-providers) and ADSL service to the costumers. ree 
major cases are to be mentioned: Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and Telefonica.
In 2007 both the Commission and the Court maintained that approach. e Court of First 
Instance approved the former Commission’s decision in the France Telecom case in January, 
and the Commission decided in the Telefonica case in June. Since then the Commission has 
been threatening several national incumbent telephone companies to launch investigation 
against them for similar exclusionary behaviors. In this paper I examine the question that 
whether the use of the AKZO-rule in exclusionary dominant cases can be substantiated by 
economic eects of the alleged abuse and harming the consumer in the short run as well as 
in the long run.
In its Wanadoo decision of 2003, the European Commission applied the AKZO test 
and explicitly rejected the notion that recoupment of losses should be part of the test for 
predation. e Commission’s approach was upheld by the Court of First Instance. Although 
many commentators considered this was inconsistent with contemporary economic theory 
and unnecessarily diverged from the analysis under US antitrust law, the Commission’s Sta 
Discussion Paper of 2005 maintained that separate proof of (the possibility of) recoupment 
18 In AKZO, the predation intentions were derived partly from company documentation but it leaves a huge uncertainty 
for dominant firms how to be advised to be more careful in what they record. In WANADOO, the Commission relied 
firmly on a number of internal documents to indicate that the dominant firm lowered its prices in order to ‘pre-empt’ 
a developing market. That was what the Court thought to be incriminating words.  
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was not required to nd an abuse. Against this background, the Commission’s Guidance 
appears to propose a blend of old and new theories. e Commission indicates it will 
generally intervene where a dominant rm engages in predatory conduct “by deliberately 
incurring losses or foregoing prots in the short term … so as to foreclose, or be likely to 
foreclose, one or more of its actual or potential competitors with a view to strengthening or 
maintaining its market power, thereby causing consumer harm” (Janssens 2009).
Despite the outpouring of academic writing in the area of predatory pricing in the last thirty 
years19, the courts on both sides of the Atlantic have remained adverse to new developments 
in economic theory in this area. It seems that AKZO (in Europe) and BROOKE GROUP (in
the U.S.) remain applicable despite their evident shortcomings in terms of the below-cost 
test. Although it seems that in both cases the same test was applied, the consequences to 
future cases were quite dierent. In US, aer BROOK GROUP, plaintis have become more 
reluctant and cautious to bring a predatory case in the Court. At the same time, however, 
since AKZO Commission has become more and more active to try predatory pricing cases, 
on the basis of the AKZO rules. How could that happen? Is it because in the EU, economists 
seem to have much less inuence on the Courts that in the US? Yes, I think that could one a 
part of the answer. But the economic theory itself is not that clear on the subject.
Lawyers and judges have rarely been as dependent on economic theories to substantiate 
their arguments as in the area of predatory behavior; but given that the characteristics of 
predation – and indeed its very existence – are ercely debated among economists, it is no 
wonder that the legal community has been puzzled, and at times misled, by the numerous 
economic theories (and intense ideological activism) in this area. Can lawyers really be 
blamed, when economists suggest diverging or even atly contradicting theories about 
predatory pricing? (Ritter 2004)
Alternative Tests Used in Predatory Cases
e economic literature provides a few suggestions how to test an alleged predation 
which can be used instead of the AKZO-rules. Joskow and Klevorick (1979) suggested a 
modications of the ATC test that require the existence of structural preconditions as a 
rst-stage lter. e rst set of factors to be examined include proxies for market power, 
such as the predator’s market share, the size of other rms in the market, the stability of 
market shares, the predatory rm’s prot history, and the residual elasticity of demand. 
e second set of factors to be examined are proxies regarding conditions of entry into the 
market. e third step would be to examine generally the dynamic eects of entrants on the 
market conditions. If the structural analysis suggests little danger of successful predation, 
Joskow and Klevorick would preclude plaintis from pursuing such cases. In cases where 
the rst stage analysis suggests that predatory harm is possible, a price below AVC would be 
a sucient but not necessary to nd predation. In general, Joskow and Klevorick advocate 
a presumption of illegality for prices below ATC. Prices above ATC would be presumed 
legal unless the price cut was reversed within a reasonable period of time (for example, two 
years) (Kobayashi 2000:29).
In an early article, Baumol (1996) notes that AVC is not well dened. Baumol would use 
average avoidable costs (AAC) as the price oor, where AAC are dened to include variable 
19 For an outlook, see for example Niels and Ten Kate (2000).
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costs and all xed costs that are not sunk. Because a rm can minimize its losses by exiting 
whenever prices are below average avoidable costs (AAC), prices below AAC necessarily 
involve a prot sacrice. AAC, and not marginal cost, will also dene the shut down point 
for an equally ecient rival. us, prices above AAC will not exclude an equally ecient 
rival, while prices below AAC will be exclusionary. 
Bolton, Bradley and Riordan (2000) suggest a two tier test which would examine ve 
elements. In the rst tier, the plainti must prove: (1) a facilitating market structure; (2) a 
scheme of predation and supporting evidence; and (3) probable recoupment. Only if the 
plainti proves these three elements would the inquiry proceed to examine (4) whether 
price exceeded cost and (5) the absence of a business justication or eciencies defense. 
While these elements are consistent with the traditional antitrust analysis of predatory 
pricing under BROOKE GROUP (see discussion below), each stage of this analysis can be 
accounted for any of the modern strategic predation models. For example, the rst stage 
analysis could incorporate reputation models of predation by creating a presumption of high 
entry and reentry barriers based on an incumbent’s past reputation as a predator. Strategic 
theory would also allow the plainti a menu of alternatives as a basis for proving a scheme 
of predation. In addition, a coherent strategic theory supported by evidence would allow 
courts to apply a less demanding standard when assessing the probability of recoupment. 
With respect to the cost test, Bolton, et al. would adopt Baumol’s AAC benchmark, or use 
long run average incremental costs (Ordover and Saloner 1989).
Others have attempted to devise tests that would go beyond the cost based rules in an 
attempt to detect above-cost, but strategic, pricing. Instead of relying on the static relationship 
between price and cost to dene predation, these authors use the intertemporal price 
pattern of a rm engaged in strategic pricing to devise a rule against predation. ese tests 
would allow aggressive pricing by the incumbent rm, but would seek to punish attempts 
to recoup the sacrice of prots by making any price cuts “quasi permanent”. Because the 
potential predatory rm would be required to suer the losses of non-compensatory price 
cuts or output expansions over the longer period dened by the rule, such a rule would 
increase the costs of predation (Kobayashi 2000:31).
Edlin (2002) proposes a rule that would prevent an incumbent from reducing prices 
in response to entry accompanied by a substantial price discount. Limiting the rule to 
“substantial” price discounts would prevent weak entry. In addition, he argues that such a 
rule will better control above-cost exclusionary limit pricing, and will give better incentives 
for incumbents to lower their pre-entry price. 
Elhauge (2003) notes that these dynamic predation rules that would restrict the 
incumbent’s ability to react to entry are likely to be futile and harmful. Specically, 
incumbents’ reactions to entry may be a normal and pro-competitive response when such 
entry will undermine an output maximizing competitive schedule of discriminatory prices. 
Even in the absence of competitive price discrimination, Elhauge shows that such rules can 
decrease both productive eciency, and consumer welfare. Moreover, such rules are not well 
formulated to operate in real world markets, and would have unavoidable implementation 
diculties. ese diculties include the lack of well dened price oors and ambiguities in 
dening when entry or exit occurs. In addition, it is possible that these rules could increase 
the credibility of a multi-market predator and may serve to increase the probability that 
predation or entry deterrence is successful. 
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Lang and O’Donoghue (2002) expressed some cautions against the strict requirement of 
recoupment. It is oen dicult to prove what a dominant rm could do successfully at an 
unspecied time in the future. In order to do that, it would be necessary to show that there 
would be no entry by more competitive and determined rivals, when the dominant rm 
increases its price. It would also be necessary to show that price of the product is inelastic 
in a sense that, although buyers were accustomed to low prices but they would be willing to 
pay signicantly higher prices in the future.
We can agree with Areeda and Hovenkamp (2006:323) in the notion that “no shortage 
of theories, but a frightening inability of courts to assess them.” In the past two decades, 
scholarship on the economics of predatory pricing has evolved from the relatively settled 
consensus in which predatory pricing was thought to be irrational, rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful, to a point where much less is settled. Recent theoretical work 
emphasizing strategic theory has shown that predation can be rational, and empirical 
studies have presented evidence consistent with successful predation. However, the 
literature’s response to predatory pricing, a relatively administrable and permissive rule 
based in part on the assumption that successful predation was rare, has remained relatively 
intact. While the recent economic literature may have eroded this basis for the adoption of 
permissive standards for predatory pricing, other reasons for adopting such a rule, based 
on the benets of bright line rules that would be administrable by courts, still remain. 
The France Télécom (Wanadoo) Case
In January 2007, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) handed down an antitrust 
Judgment in the case of France Télécom SA v Commission (France Telecom), addressing a 
number of issues relating to predatory pricing in the EU. By that ruling, an extremely strict 
and approach to EU law on predatory pricing has been conrmed. e CFI has declined 
to reject the Commission’s form-based ‘legal’ approach instead of a more eects-based 
analysis. is case was not helped by unhelpful internal documents and the inability of the 
parties to explain them away at trial.
For rms which may have market power, the road ahead remains fraught with diculties, 
particularly in relation to how they respond to aggressive competition. It is essential 
that clear contemporaneous evidence of legitimate business practices are kept and that 
documents which are liable to mischaracterisation (or worse) are not created.
While the calculations of prices and costs in the case were complicated by the 
particularities of the communications sector, the judgment provides guidance across all 
sectors. In particular:
e European Commission (the “Commission”) has a broad discretion in selecting the ??
appropriate accounting methodology. e onus rests on the applicant to show that the 
methodology adopted by the Commission is unlawful, and that its adoption amounts to 
a manifest error. It is not enough that another methodology was a credible alternative. 
e CFI’s deference to the Commission’s discretion in this regard has disturbing echoes 
to the approach it used to take in relation to the importance of economic assessments in 
antitrust cases.
Where there is evidence of a strategy and/ or intent to foreclose, a dominant entity has ??
no absolute right to match its competitors’ prices.
??
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All presentations by/documents from management will almost certainly be reviewed by ??
a regulator looking for signs of predatory intent.
e fact that recoupment of losses is unlikely is no defense. ??
However, it may be a relevant factor in considering whether there was an intention to ??
predate.
In its 16 July 2003 decision, the Commission found that Wanadoo Interactive SA 
(“Wanadoo”) had infringed Article 82 EC by charging predatory prices for its eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL services that, until August 2001, did not enable it to cover its variable costs 
and, aer August 2001, did not cover its total costs, as part of a plan to pre-empt the market 
for high-speed Internet access during a key phase in the development of the market. 
France Télécom appealed the Commission’s decision, claiming the Commission had 
inter alia:
applied a cost recovery test that was contrary to Article 82 EC both in relation to the ??
costs taken into account and the methodology;
taken an approach which denied France Télécom its fundamental right to align its ??
conduct to that of its competitors; and
made errors of law and manifest errors of assessment in nding that France Télécom ??
had a plan of predation and that it was not necessary to prove that France Télécom had 
recovered its losses.
In this judgment, the CFI considered the cost recovery test applied by the Commission, and 
the methodology on which the nding of abuse rested. Having observed that the Commission 
must be aorded a broad discretion for complex economic assessments, the CFI reviewed 
the Commission’s approach to calculation of both average variable and average total costs. 
e Commission accepted that, in an embryonic market, where customer acquisition costs 
represent a substantial proportion of expenditure, a provider cannot immediately recover 
its full costs. It therefore considered whether the revenues covered adjusted costs.
e CFI found that the Commission’s calculation of costs, including its decision to 
spread customer acquisition costs across the estimated minimum subscription period, was 
appropriate, even though France Télécom itself did not depreciate the relevant expenditure 
in this way. Further, the CFI found that the Commission had correctly not taken subsequent 
reductions that were not foreseeable at the time of the alleged abuse into account in assessing 
recurrent costs at the time of the alleged abuse.
Finally, in relation to determining the appropriate methodology for calculating costs, the 
CFI considered France Télécom’s argument that the only appropriate costing methodology 
was discounted cash-ows, noting that it is not enough to show that an alternative 
methodology could be appropriate, France Télécom would have had to show that the 
Commission’s use of depreciated assets and costs was unlawful. France Télécom failed to 
do so.
In considering France Télécom’s claim that the Commission’s nding of predation had 
deprived France Télécom of the ability to meet its competitors’ prices, the CFI found that 
a dominant entity has only a limited right to do so. e CFI noted that the only previous 
Judgment of the Court which described such a right referred to matching prices only in 
respect of a particular customer, not across the board. Further, the CFI noted that that 
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previous Judgment had not ruled on the questions as to whether it is lawful to align prices 
where doing so would involve pricing below cost.
In considering precisely that question in this case, the CFI stated that a dominant 
undertaking cannot be permitted to take steps to protect its commercial interests if its 
purpose is to strengthen its dominant position. As a result, a dominant entity has no absolute 
right to align its prices to those of its competitors. Even if to do so is not in itself abusive or 
objectionable, it might become so when it is aimed not only at protecting its interests but 
also at strengthening and abusing a dominant position. As such, the CFI is sending quite 
clear signals that it will read the “meeting competition” defence narrowly.
In assessing the suciency of the documents relied on by the Commission to establish 
that there was a predatory plan sucient to show predatory intent, the CFI noted that the 
impugned documents were from management-level sta and related to formal presentations 
and a detailed framework letter related to the decision-making process for France Télécom’s 
business. In this respect, the Commission’s tough approach to exclusionary abuses has been 
reinforced.
France Télécom submitted that if a dominant entity cannot reasonably expect to reduce 
long-term competition with a view to recouping its losses, it is not rational for that entity 
to engage in predatory pricing. In essence, it argued that unlikely recoupment of losses was 
a defense to predatory pricing. e CFI, referring to the Judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Tetra Pak II rearmed that proof of recoupment is not a pre-condition to a nding 
of predatory pricing. However, the CFI’s parting words regarding recoupment could be 
construed as implying that recoupment may be relevant in considering whether there is a 
plan to eliminate competition. It may be that the Commission needs to nuance the language 
in paragraph 122 of its discussion paper on the application of Article 82 EC to exclusionary 
abuses to reect this potential evidentiary role for the likelihood of recoupment.
Mazák Standings on the Case
Advocate General Mazák has issued a call for less aggressive use of predatory pricing 
in his Opinion of 25 September 2008 relating to the France Télécom decision where the 
Commission found that the appellant charged predatory prices below variable costs (AVC) 
until August 2001, and above AVC but below average total cost (ATC) from August 2001 
onwards, as part of a plan to pre-empt the market in high-speed internet access during a 
key phase in its development.  
Essentially the appellant should win on following grounds:
1) CFI failed to state reasons when commenting on a dominant rm’s right to align prices
2) CFI failed to state reasons why recoupment need not be shown
3) Likely recoupment must be demonstrated by the Commission in predatory pricing 
cases
4) In addition the Mazák also said that in his view a dominant rm should, on occasion, be 
allowed to align its prices with those of competitors.
e CFI ruled that the rm’s conduct was predatory (below AVC for a period and between 
AVC and ATC with intention for another period). erefore the pricing fell squarely withing 
the AKZO rules. So the behaviour is in itself abusive. Accordingly there was no need for the 
CFI to assess the formulation. In line with Community case-law, the Commission regarded 
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as abusive prices below average variable costs. In that case, the eliminatory nature of such 
pricing is presumed. In relation to full costs, the Commission had also to provide evidence 
that France Télécom’s predatory pricing formed part of a plan to ‘pre-empt’ the market. In 
the two situations, it was not necessary to establish in addition proof that France Télécom 
had a realistic chance of recouping its losses. 
at all was a mistake, said Mazák. e Advocate General is calling for a major change in 
the law on below cost pricing, by placing a greater focus on the impact on consumer welfare 
and less on the economic freedom of market participants. e problem is that the case law 
which seemingly creates the basis for this shi does not support it. AKZO and Tetra Pak 2 
are clearly cases where the dominant concern is the preservation of rivalry, of a competitive 
process. e radical change called for here should be made by advising the Court to change 
its approach rather than by asking the court to reinterpret its case law.
What can Economists Accomplish?
Realizing the problem initiated by the courts inability to assess complex economic theories, 
OECD held a Roundtable discussion on the subject in 2008 (OECD 2008). As a result, they 
concluded in several suggestion on the matter, which could, by all means, serve this paper 
as conclusions. In order to make courts to be able to handle economic theories during a 
deliberation of a case, competition authorities (including the European Commission itself) 
should 
recognize that maximization of consumer welfare is best achieved by a competition ??
policy centered on the analysis of the likely eects of rms’ conduct. It also acknowledges 
that eects analysis should be solidly grounded in economics. e growing acceptance of 
the importance of economics has been reected not just in the enforcement practice of 
national competition agencies but also in the attitude of the courts. In particular, there 
have been increasing demands for substantial economic support for arguments advanced 
in a competition law context. By developing an enforcement culture based on economics 
at the level of the national competition authorities one encourages the acceptance of 
economic methodology by the courts;
support was voiced for educating judges in economics and economic methodology. Such ??
training represents a positive way to develop the judges’ analytical skills. Given that in 
some jurisdictions judges may not understand the economics of the government’s case 
and may seek out some procedural resolution in order to dispose of the case in a manner 
that does not require them to deal with the actual substance of the case, it is imperative that 
judges should be encouraged to become more sophisticated in competition economics. 
At the same time, judges should be informed of the limitations of economic evidence 
and that one that can rarely depend on uncontested data to produce a single numerical 
“solution” to a given problem;
in terms of eective techniques for the presentation of complex economic evidence, it is ??
essential that the evidence be presented to the court in a way that is credible, simple and 
well-supported by the facts before it. e challenge here for the competition authorities 
is to present economic reasoning in an understandable but not less precise way to non-
experts, that is, judges. In order to ensure comprehensibility, the problem at issue should 
be clearly identied, and any economic argument should be put forward in such a way as 
to allow the reader or listener to easily follow it. 
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Inform the court of any assumptions relied upon as well as the reasons for determining ??
parameters. Furthermore, advocates for the authorities should be ready to explain why 
other assumptions or parameters were not used. It is important to know and explain 
at trial the limits of the data that is relied upon. Any economic conclusions that are 
advanced at trial should be based on relevant facts and should draw on established 
economy theory (OECD 2008:8–10).
If competition authorities indeed share these views and act accordingly, cases to be presented 
to the courts will denitely be more grounded with the solid base of economic theory, 
which is the ultimate reason why we have competition laws at all. In the cases of predation, 
AKZO rules shall be replaced by more sophisticated complex economic tests in the future. 
The Need for Objective and Predictable Standards
As an economist, I cannot agree more with the conclusion of the previous section. But 
unfortunately, the views of an economist are not the only relevant views concerning 
predation. Let me nish this paper with some comments on the subject partially on a 
personal level. e importance of this issue will be evident to anyone who has had experience 
counseling a corporation that may be subject to an allegation of predatory pricing. at 
counselor’s perspective is very dierent than that of a scholar or a government decision 
maker.20 Someone who works inside a company or advises a company may have to decide 
very quickly whether the company can legally cut a price, and if so, how much. ere is not 
enough time to do complicated economic studies. ere is not enough time to do a massive 
le search to see whether there are “bloodthirsty sentiments expressed somewhere in the 
bowels of the company”21. ere is not enough time to recast the company’s accounting 
system in order to accommodate the most sophisticated and nuanced expressions of an 
Areeda-Turner test.
Leary developed a simple test which could have farer reaching consequences. One 
practical approach, Leary suggested, was to ask business people inside a company whether 
they expected “to make any money” under the newly proposed prices. And if they asked 
“by what standard,” we would say by “your standard”. e question is “do you anticipate that 
you are going to make any money, as you understand it, at this price?” If the answer was yes, 
then that may be enough. If the answer was no, then the next question is “why are you doing 
it?” at might yield some interesting answers. Based on his experience, we may have some 
presumptive standards which can be applied prospectively (Leary 2001).
If we had to go beyond the cost-based standards, we can use the proposed test that the 
court addressed in American Airlines. is proposed test would require a determination of 
“whether the incumbent had clear alternatives that the incumbent knew or could reasonably 
be expected to have known would have made it more money absent any predation prots”, 
American Airline (...). What does that mean? As soon as there is new entry or some kind of 
price action by a competitor, the prot maximizing price of the dominant rm or any rm 
will change. And the prot-maximizing price continues to change depending upon what 
20 I have had the pleasure of being in all of these positions (fortunately not at the same time).
21 This quotation comes from Thomas Leary, a former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. The views ex-
pressed here are mainly his but I totally agree with them, see Leary (2001). 
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that competitor or other competitors do with their prices, and depending upon how much 
business they capture. As a practical matter, the market’s adjustment to a new equilibrium is 
likely to be an iterative process. If a plainti or a prosecutor were to claim that any price below 
this constantly changing prot maximizing price is presumptively suspect, that would not 
only be impractical but also anticompetitive (Leary 2001).
Another issue concerning whether the dominant rm can, at the least, meet competition. 
What is the established rm supposed to do if there is a new entrant building its market 
share? Is it supposed to continue charging its prot-maximizing price on the assumption 
that the old competitive equilibrium still exist? Is there some kind of a market position that 
it has to give away to a new competitor? Is there any solid grounds on which it would be 
legally required to give away the new competitor a certain amount of market share? And 
even there were, how could we expect that a dominant rm could ne tune its market 
responses on that assumption.
Conclusion
As long as the AKZO rules will remain the decisive basis for ruling in predatory (exclusionary) 
pricing cases, you can tell several reasonable advises as a consultant to a dominant company 
based on the doubts and questions raised in this paper but it would probably not serve 
the best interests of the rm. You could discuss with your company each of the innovative 
proposals that have been proposed as alternatives or supplements to the traditional cost-
based tests for predation. But the AKZO rules not only prevailing in the EU but much more 
simple and easier to follow that any other alternative test.
ere are very serious theoretical and practical problems that will arise if we abandon 
objective cost-price tests that companies can apply up front. We should recognize that these 
tests may have to be modied or rened before to apply but it is worth the eort to do 
so. But the only hope of changing the prevailing dominancy of the AKZO test is that a 
dominant company will apply dierent approaches acting more aggressively with prices and 
will successfully be able to defend its behavior against the Commission and/or the Courts. 
Until then, the practical advises could go like these: be aware of your AVC all the time, keep 
your accountants knowledgeable about the dierent ways to calculate variable costs, do not 
set out your competition strategy expressly aimed against any of your competitors, and try 
to keep your prices very close to the AC. Does it seem rational to any one? Of course not but 
nor does the existing legislation in the EU concerning predatory pricing.
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